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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
 This appeal is from a conviction for one count of tax evasion, a second 
degree felony, and three counts of failure to render a tax return, a third 
degree felony, all in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-8-1101, in the Third 
Judicial District Court, in and for Salt Lake County, State of Utah, the 
Honorable Roger S. Dutson, presiding. Jurisdiction is conferred upon this 
Court pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78A-4-103(2)(e) (2018).  
INTRODUCTION 
 Scott Alan Rasmussen has a good faith disagreement with the Utah 
State Tax Commission. The Tax Commissions claims he owes income tax. 
Rasmussen believes he doesn’t. This dispute dates back to 2002 when, after 
extensive research, Rasmussen concluded that he is a “common law 
-2- 
employee” whose wages and compensation do not constitute reportable 
income and that, therefore, he had no duty to file income tax returns.  
 But he knew he had a duty to notify the government, and so in 2002 
he filed W-4 forms stating his exempt status. The Internal Revenue Service 
acquiesced, and for more than a decade his exempt status was 
unchallenged. Then, in 2013, the Utah State Tax Commission notified 
Rasmussen that he owed back taxes. Rasmussen responded with a detailed 
memorandum explaining the legal basis for his exemption. But the Tax 
Commission rejected Rasmussen’s rational and he was ultimately charged 
with 12 counts of criminal tax violations. Jurors acquitted him of most of the 
charges, but convicted on four. Rasmussen appeals. 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE 
 Whether the trial court failed to properly instruct the jury on 
Rasmussen’s “good faith” belief that he was not required to file income tax 
returns. 
 Standard of Review: Where a defendant is legally entitled to have a 
particular instruction given to the jury, the trial court’s failure to do so is 
reviewed for an abuse of discretion. Miller v. Utah Dep’t of Transp., 2012 UT 
54, ¶13, 285 P.3d 1208. 
-3-
Preservation: This issue is preserved by defense counsel’s objection to 
removing language concerning good faith as a defense to all of the counts. 
R514, 516, 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Summary of facts.
           Scott Rasmussen is not a tax protester. Nor does he believe that taxes 
are unconstitutional or otherwise illegal. Rather, he simply believes, 
based on his own extensive research, that a “common law employee,” 
such as himself, has no “income,” as that term is defined in the tax code 
and other government publications, and therefore is exempt from the 
require to pay income tax or file tax returns. 
For those reasons, he has filed no tax returns for more than a decade. 
For those reasons, he also went to prison. 
“I dug into it.” 
While working as a manufacturing engineer for Boing, 
Rasmussen and his wife paid income tax from 1989 through 1999. R581. 
Then, after paying his taxes for 2000, he received a “nice letter” from the 
IRS stating that he owed an additional $2500. R581. “I got mad and paid 
it.” Id. But 
-4-
when he was assessed a deficiency again the following year—this time for 
$3000—he decided to research the basis for his tax liability. Id. 
At trial, he explained his thinking: “Well, first of all, why am I 
paying taxes? What’s it all about? You know? What does it mean to pay 
taxes? You know? So I dug into it.” R582. 
The “aha!” moment 
Rasmussen spent many countless hours in the evening researching 
his tax liability. His conclusions, although contrary to standard 
interpretations of the tax code, display an internal logic and are 
grounded in statutes, tax publications, and case law. See R574-607 
(Rasmussen testimony) and State’s Exhibit 16 (Memorandum of Points 
and Authorities (“Rasmussen Memo.”)).  
Rasmussen testified that the “aha!” moment came when he was 
reviewing IRS publications 560 and 15, which discuss the difference 
between an independent contractor, a statutory employee, and a 
common law employee. R586; see Retirement Plans for Small Business 
(SEP, SIMPLE, and Qualified Plans), I.R.S. Pub. No. 560, Cat. No. 46574N 
(February 3, 2014), https://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-prior/p560--2013.pdf; 
Employer's Tax Guide, I.R.S. Pub. No. 15, Cat. No. 10000W (February 5, 
2013), https://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-prior/p15--2013.pdfi “Publication 
-5- 
560 addresses a common law employee under definitions you need to 
know, and it says right in there a common law employee is not self- 
employed.” Id. He concluded that “if you file a 1040 and you don't know 
any better you automatically became a business. Okay? And it's known 
as a sole proprietorship.” R583. “So I am realizing, wow, okay, I'm not a 
business while I am at work, but yet somehow when I pay taxes I'm a 
business.” R586. 
 As Rasmussen saw it, only businesses had “income” because only 
“profit” constitutes “income” for tax purposes. See R583.  “The point that 
I’ve been trying to make all along is that in order to pay taxes, you 
necessarily have to be a business entity. The State has been unable to 
identify which type of business entity that I am. So I don't mind 
complying, but I wish that they would have been able to be more explicit 
about the basis, the fundamental fact of why I need to pay taxes on my 
employment pay.” R690. 
 In his memorandum, Rasmussen discusses the “3 Categories of 
Control”—Behavioral Control, Financial Control, and the Relationship, of 
the parties—which determine whether a worker is a 
business/independent contractor, who generates taxable income, or an 
employee, who does not. R724; see also Independent Contractor vs. 
-6- 
Employee, I.R.S. Topic 762, https://www.irs.gov/taxtopics/tc762. One 
criterion defining an employee is the “extent to which the worker can 
realize a profit or incur a loss.” R724. Rasmussen concluded:  
I am a common law employee. I do not consider my payroll 
wages as income, as would an independent contractor. I have 
no opportunity for profit or gain, as would an independent 
contractor. Therefore, I have no realized tax liability, unlike 
an independent contractor, and no requirement to file an 
income tax return. I am mindful that this is in regard to my 
employment wages only.  
 
 R724 (emphasis in original). At trial, he testified: “I decided to terminate 
my business as a sole proprietor, because all I recognized was a loss, 
because I had—I had no—I was in no position to see a profit. So what I 
did was I filed exempt on my W-4 form.” Id. 
 In 2002, Rasmussen filed a W-4 form along with a handwritten note 
to the IRS explaining that he was exempt from paying income tax. R586-
87. In response, the IRS wrote: “We are returning the document checked 
at the right (Form W-4). Please keep them for your records unless 
otherwise indicated.” Rasmussen interpreted this response as tacit 
agreement from the IRS to his asserted exemption:  
After receiving this reply from the IRS, I thought that if I 
were in error the IRS would have taken this opportunity to 
do its “due diligence” to clarify the matter and straighten 
me out. Neither myself nor any of my Employers have 
received a “lock in letter” or “Modification Notice” since I 
-7- 
began filing EXEMPT in June 2002. I have assumed that all 
my employers have followed the requirements as stated in 
Publication 505 (2002). And that both the IRS and Utah Tax 
Commission were aware of my Exempt from withholding. 
 
R725 (emphasis in original); see also R602-03. 
 Each year for more than a decade, Rasmussen filed W-4s. See 
Defendant’s Exhibit 1 (W-4 forms for 2010-12). His exempt status was 
never challenged until 2013 when he received a letter from the 
Commission informing him that he owed taxes. R689. After receiving the 
letter, Rasmussen “dug into it” again and renewed his research into state 
and federal tax law. R590.  
 In his memorandum, Rasmussen quotes from a Commission 
publication titled “Who Must File a Utah Income Tax Return.”  It states 
that the “following individuals must file individual tax returns: 
 1. Every Utah resident or part-year resident who must 
file a federal income tax return; 
 2. Every nonresident with income from Utah sources 
who must file a federal return; and 
 3. Taxpayers wanting a refund of any income tax 
overpaid. 
 
R722.  Rasmussen concluded: “I understand this to mean that if there is 
no requirement to file a federal income tax return, then there is no 
requirement to file a state income tax return. Both returns are contingent 
upon recognized income. Either both returns (Federal and State) are 
-8- 
required or both are not required.” Id. 
 B. Procedural history. 
 Rasmussen was charged by Information with six counts of intent to 
evade, a second degree felony, and six counts of failing to render a tax 
return, a third degree felony, for the years 2011 to 2016. R82-87. He was also 
charged with one count of pattern of unlawful activity, a second degree 
felony, for 2006 through 2016. R87-88. 
 On the second day of trial, the court granted a defense motion to 
dismiss the pattern of unlawful activity after determining that Rasmussen 
acted alone, had not conspired or attempted to indoctrinate anyone, and 
therefore could not be considered an “enterprise” for purposes of the 
statute. R568-69. In his ruling, the judge stated: “I think normally we think 
of enterprise as some kind of a business or some type of an organization for 
funneling the energies and activities into criminal conduct. This case 
appears to me to be a case where if the defendant is guilty of the other 
offenses that are charged that he was doing it on his own. There doesn't 
appear to be any other persons involved in this activity.” R568. 
  The jury convicted Rasmussen on four counts, but acquitted him on 
eight other charges. R659. Rasmussen was convicted on one count of tax 
evasion for 2016 and three counts of failure to render tax returns for 2014 
through 2016. R659; see also Jury Instructions 8, 10, 11, and 12.  
-9- 
 Rasmussen was sentenced to zero to five years on the three counts of 
failure to file and one to 15 years on the single count of tax evasion. R691. 
He was also ordered to pay restitution of $23,930, an amount that later 
reduced by stipulation to $11,597. Id.; see R313-14.  He was ordered to begin 
his sentence “forthwith” on October 20, 2017, and he remains incarcerated. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
 Rasmussen’s extensive research into his tax liability and his 
unwavering conclusion that he is exempt from income tax demonstrates a 
good faith belief that he did not owe taxes. If the trial court had adequately 
instructed the jury on the “good faith” defense, there is a reasonable 
probability that Rasmussen would have been acquitted on all counts. The 
trial court should have explicitly instructed the jury that Rasmussen’s good 
faith belief, which was premised on his exhaustive review of official tax 
code rules and publications, exempted him from tax liability. The trial 
court’s rejection of such an instruction was prejudicial error that requires 
reversal of Rasmussen’s convictions. 
-10- 
ARGUMENT 
THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR 
IN OMITTING A JURY INSTRUCTION ON 
RASMUSSEN’S “GOOD FAITH” DEFENSE OF HIS 
EXEMPT STATUS.  
A. Ignorance of the law is no excuse—except when it 
comes to tax law. 
 
  As the United Stated Supreme Court has stated: “The general rule 
that ignorance of the law or a mistake of law is no defense to criminal 
prosecution is deeply rooted in the American legal system.” Cheek v. U.S., 
498 U.S. 192, 199, 111 S.Ct. 604 (1991); see also, e.g., United States v. Rosenfield, 
469 F.2d 598, 601 (3d Cir. 1972) (in failure-to-file case, “ignorance of a crime 
is no excuse, but ignorance of a duty may be where, as here, willfulness is 
an element of the crime”).  
 But even that bedrock legal principle has at least one exception. 
Because of the complexity of the tax laws, most jurisdictions accept the 
proposition that a defendant may be acquitted of certain criminal tax 
charges if the violations are premised on a good faith misinterpretation of 
the tax code. Cheek, 498 U.S. at 199. The “proliferation of statutes and 
regulations has sometimes made it difficult for the average citizen to know 
and comprehend the extent of the duties and obligations imposed by the tax 
laws.” Id. at 199-200.  
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 In recognition of this legal complexity, Congress “softened the 
impact” of tax code violations by stating that defendant cannot be convicted 
of tax evasion unless the government proves beyond a reasonable doubt a 
specific intent to violate the law. Id. at 200. Supreme Court jurisprudence 
has dovetailed with Congressional intent by interpreting the term 
“willfully” in criminal tax statutes to mean “an act done with a bad 
purpose” or “with an evil motive.” United States v. Murdock, 290 U.S. 389, 
394-94, 54 S.Ct. 223 (1933). “Congress did not intend that a person, by 
reason of a bona fide misunderstanding as to his liability for the tax, as to 
his duty to make a return, or as to the adequacy of the records he 
maintained, should become a criminal by his mere failure to measure up to 
the prescribed standard of conduct.” Id., at 396, 54 S.Ct., at 226.1 
                                            
 1 Many courts have limited the “good faith” defense. For example, at 
least two federal courts of appeal have stated that good faith is not a defense 
to fraud. United States v. Hildebrandt, 961 F.2d 116, 119 (8th Cir. 1992) (“The 
Cheek holding was premised on the complexity of the tax laws, and 
Hildebrandt was convicted under a general criminal statute containing a 
straightforward prohibition against making false, fictitious, or fraudulent 
statements to the government”); United States v. Hollis, 971 F.2d 1441, 1444 
(10th Cir. 1992) (good faith exception not available to defendants charged 
with bank mail and bank fraud). Nonetheless, the United States Supreme 
Court has declined to limit the good faith defense to cases involving income 
tax evasion or failure to file. In Ratzlaf v. United States, 510 U.S. 135, 141, 114 
S.Ct. 655 (1994), the court held that good faith may also excuse currency 
structuring, which “is not inevitably nefarious” and is often undertaken for 
legal purposes.  
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 Many jurisdictions, including the 10th Circuit Court of Appeals, which 
includes Utah, have stated that the good faith defense is available even if a 
defendant’s interpretations of the tax laws are irrational. “We must remind 
ourselves here that the good-faith defense need not be rational, if there is 
sufficient evidence from which a reasonable jury could conclude that even 
irrational beliefs were truly held.” United States v. Mann, 884 F.2d 532, 537 
(10th Cir. 1989). 
 In Mann, the defendant was convicted of failure to file tax returns, 
despite evidence that he believed he was exempt, in part because he 
believed wages were not income. Id. at 534. The 10th Circuit reversed, 
holding that a defendant “cannot be held to guilty knowledge of falsity of 
his statements simply because a reasonable man under the same or similar 
circumstances would have known of the falsity of such statements.” Id. 
(citation and internal punctuation omitted). 
 The Mann case offers a template for the robust good faith defense that 
should have been available to Rasmussen. Mann was convicted of mail 
fraud, wire fraud and willful failure to file income tax returns over a 10-year 
period. Mann testified that his failure to file was based on years of research, 
including United States Supreme Court decisions that led him to believe he 
was not required to file income tax returns. Id. at 534. Among Mann’s 
theories was his belief, similar to Rasmussen’s, that taxes applied only to 
-13- 
corporations and that wages are not income. Id. But, unlike Rasmussen, 
Mann widely disseminated his views, which he compiled and published in 
the Spotlight, a magazine with worldwide subscription. Id. He also 
publicized his views through a purchased advertisement on a radio station. 
Id. 
 On appeal, the 10th Circuit affirmed Mann’s conviction for mail fraud, 
but reversed the convictions for wire fraud and failure to file. Id. at 536. The 
court held that the evidence was sufficient to support failure to file, but held 
that the trial court erred when it did not explicitly instruct the jury 
regarding Mann’s good faith defense. Id. As the court stated: “We have held 
that a defendant’s good-faith belief that he is not required to file a return is a 
valid defense in this context, and the beliefs need not be reasonable if 
actually held in good faith.” Id. 
 With regard to the requisite mental state, the court held that a 
“general instruction” on willfulness was insufficient. Id. at 537. “[T]he 
general instruction on willfulness given here is not adequate in this circuit 
to present the defense of good faith.” Id. In support, the 10th Circuit cited 
Mathews v. United States, 485 U.S. 58, 108 S.Ct. 883, 887 (1988), which held: 
“As a general proposition a defendant is entitled to an instruction as to any 
recognized defense for which there exists evidence sufficient for a 
reasonable jury to find in his favor.” Three years later, the United States 
-14- 
Supreme Court reiterated the importance of instructing the jury on the need 
for finding that the tax evader act willfully. Cheek v. U.S., 498 U.S. 192, 111 
S.Ct. 604 (1991). “[I]t was error for the court to instruct the jury that 
petitioner’s asserted beliefs that wages are not income and that he was not a 
taxpayer within the meaning of the Internal Revenue Code should not be 
considered by the jury in determining whether Cheek had acted willfully.” 
Id. at 206-07. 
  Some jurisdictions, including Utah, have been reluctant to follow the 
lead of the Supreme Court and Congress in to “soften the impact” of 
criminal tax violations. In State v. Smith, 2003 UT App 179, 72 P.3d 692, cert. 
denied,  84 P.3d 239 (2003), the Utah Court of Appeals affirmed a trial judge’s 
refusal to instruct the jury that a defendant who acted in good faith could 
not be convicted of failure to file a tax return and willful evasion. The Smith 
panel also cited State v. Stringham, 2001 UT App 13, ¶20, 17 P.3d 1153, which 
held that a separate good faith instruction was unnecessary because “a jury 
finding that the defendant has acted knowingly and willfully is inconsistent 
with a finding that the defendant acted in good faith” (citation and internal 
punctuation omitted). The Smith panel concluded that jury instructions on 
the question of good faith were adequate because, when read as a whole, 
they defined intentional or willful conduct in terms that “ensured that a jury 
-15- 
finding of good faith would lead to acquittal.” Smith, 2003 UT App 179 at 
¶23 (citation and internal punctuation omitted). 
 Nonetheless, more recent Utah cases suggest that an explicit good 
faith or “mistake of law” defense insulates a defendant from liability. “[T]he 
taxpayer can escape the penalty if he or she can show that he or she based 
the nonpayment of taxes on a legitimate, good faith interpretation of an 
arguable point of law.” Benjamin v. Utah State Tax Com’n, 2011 UT 14, ¶32, 
250 P.3d 39 (2011) In State v. Steele, 2010 UT App 185, 236 P.3d 161 (2010), 
this Court recognized that a mistake of law provides a defense where the 
mistake shows a lack of specific intent to violate the law. Id. at ¶31. 
Although we acknowledge that the Mistake of Law Statute 
indicates a legislative intent that a mistake of law defense 
must be based upon a reasonable reliance on official 
statements of the law, we also recognize that a good faith 
belief, although objectively unreasonable, could arguably 
negate a specific intent. 
 
Id. at ¶32. In State v. Eyre, 2008 UT 16, 179 P.3d 792 (2008), the Utah Supreme 
Court reversed the defendant’s conviction on six counts of felony tax 
evasion because the state had not proven the amount of the defendant’s tax 
deficiency and a relatively minor deficiency could show that the defendant 
had acted in good faith. The court stated: 
Even where the State may have been able to prove that a tax 
was due and owing, that tax may have been small enough that 
the jury could have found that Eyre in good faith believed that 
he did not have a tax deficiency and did not file as a result. 
-16- 
The probability of this result is sufficient to undermine our 
confidence in the verdicts rendered by the jury. 
 
Id. at ¶19. 
 Like most people, Rasmussen paid income tax throughout much of 
his adult life. But in 2002, after receiving what he regarded as excessive tax 
deficiencies, Rasmussen decided to research the basis for the government’s 
authority to assess income tax against him. After countless hours reviewing 
an estimated 75 volumes of IRS tax publications, R582, he concluded that he 
was a “common law employee” and that, as such, his wages and 
compensation were not “income” as that term is defined for tax purposes. 
R583.  As argued below, a properly worded good faith instruction would 
have resulted in a different verdict for Rasmussen because jurors would 
have been given the option to find that his extensive research into tax law 
led him to the reasonable belief that he was exempt and not required to file 
tax returns. 
B. The court’s general instructions on willfulness and 
intent were inadequate because they did not fully 
apprise jurors that Rasmussen’s good faith was a 
complete defense.  
 
 The trial court erred in refusing to explicitly instruct jurors that 
Rasmussen was acting on his good faith belief that he was not required to 
file income tax returns—and that his good faith belief was a complete 
-17- 
defense. This error prejudiced the verdict against Rasmussen and requires 
reversal. 
 The court’s “failure to give requested jury instructions constitutes 
reversible error only if their omission tends to mislead the jury to the 
prejudice of the complaining party or insufficiently or erroneously advises 
the jury on the law.” State v. Van Oostendorp, 2017 UT App 85, ¶12, 397 P.3d 
877 (citation omitted). In prosecutions for tax violations, clear and explicit 
instructions on good faith are critical to properly guide and avoid 
misleading the jury. “[I]nstructions on willfulness, on aspects of intent, on 
untruth of representations or fraudulent statements are not sufficient for this 
purpose. There must be a full and clear submission of the good faith defense 
as such.” United States v. Hopkins, 744 F.2d 716, 718 (10th Cir.1984) (en banc) 
(emphasis in original).  
 Here, the jury instructions did not provide a “full and clear 
submission” of Rasmussen’s good faith belief that he was not required to 
pay income tax. Indeed, the court explicitly rejected the defense’s proposed 
good faith instruction, which read: 
The government must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that 
Rasmussen knew that the law imposed a duty on him, and 
Rasmussen intentionally and voluntarily violated that duty. A 
person who acts on a good faith misunderstanding as to the 
requirements of the law does not act willfully even if his 
understanding of the law is wrong or unreasonable. 
-18- 
Nevertheless, merely disagreeing with the law does not 
constitute a good faith misunderstanding of the law. 
 
R188.  
 The trial court removed this instruction, stating that “[i]t goes too 
far.” R516. In fact, the instruction is an accurate statement of the law as 
articulated in the U.S. Supreme Court’s Cheek opinion and in the Utah 
Supreme Court’s holdings in Eyre and Steel. 
 In Cheek, the Supreme Court explicitly held that the mens rea element 
for tax violations is proven only by “negating a defendant’s claim of 
ignorance of the law or a claim that because of a misunderstanding of the 
law, he had a good-faith belief that he was not violating any of the 
provisions of the tax laws.” Cheek, 498 U.S. at 202. The court reasoned that it 
would be contradictory to allow a defendant to be convicted of violating a 
duty imposed by a criminal statute, even though he was “ignorant of it, 
misunderstand[s] the law, or believe[s] that the duty does not exist.” Id.; see 
also Steele, 2010 UT App 185, ¶32 (“[W]e also recognize that a good faith 
belief, although objectively unreasonable, could arguably negate a specific 
intent”); Eyre, 2008 UT 16, ¶19 (if properly instructed, jurors could have 
found that defendant’s tax filings were made in good faith). 
 A separate instruction on good faith is not required in the prosecution 
of most offenses, see, e.g. United States v. Chavis, 461 F.3d 1201, 1209 (10th 
-19- 
Cir.2006) (good faith instruction is not necessary “because [e.g.] a finding of 
the intent to defraud . . . necessarily implies that there was no good faith”), 
although a number of courts have endorsed the use of a separate good faith 
instruction when appropriate. See, e.g., United States v. Favato, 533 F. App'x 
127, 131 (3d Cir. 2013)  (district court properly submitted separate 
instruction explaining that good faith “would be a complete defense—
inconsistent with his acting knowingly, intentionally, or willfully. These 
instructions correctly stated the law . . .”). 
 Here, the statements on “good faith” in Rasmussen’s jury instructions 
were parsimonious and limited to only the mens rea instructions on two of 
the six charges of failure to file. In each instance, the instructions mention 
good faith by nesting it within the mens rea element instructions 10 and 12: 
“You cannot convict him [Rasmussen] of this offense unless, based on the 
evidence, you find beyond a reasonable doubt” that he failed to render tax 
returns “(3) Knowingly and intentionally, without a reasonable good faith basis; 
. . .” Instruction 10 (emphasis added). Apprising jurors that Rasmussen was 
guilty if he acted “without a reasonable good faith basis” regarding two of 
the 12 counts misstates the law because a good faith belief would have been 
a defense to all 12 counts. Rasmussen was charged with six counts of failure 
to file and six counts of tax evasion, each of which requires willfulness, 
which is, as a matter of law, negated by good faith.  
-20- 
  More specifically, the negative wording in the Jury Instructions—
“without a reasonable good faith basis”—properly advises the jury that a 
lack of good faith may be a basis for guilt, but does not affirmatively advise 
jurors that the presence of good faith requires acquittal.  
 Finally, and perhaps most fundamentally, the mens rea instruction 
misstates the law because it provided jurors with an unnecessary and 
redundant opportunity to return a guilty verdict. As defined by this Court, 
acting “knowingly and willfully” is the same as acting “without good faith.” 
See Stringham, 2001 UT App 13, ¶20 (“[I[f a jury instruction ‘already contains 
a specific statement of the government’s burden to prove the[ ] elements of 
the crime, the good faith instruction is simply a redundant version of the 
instruction on those elements’”) (quoting United States v. Gross, 961 F.2d 
1097, 1103 (3d Cir. 1992)); see also Favato, 533 F. App'x at 131 (district court 
properly submitted separate instruction explaining that good faith “would 
be a complete defense—inconsistent with his acting knowingly, 
intentionally, or willfully”). Because lack of good faith is presented as a 
separate element of the crime, without any explanation of good faith 
generally or an instruction presence of good faith is a defense, jurors could 
have found that even though Rasmussen did not act “knowingly and 
intentionally,” he nonetheless is guilty because he acted “without a 
reasonable good faith basis.” Such an interpretation would have been 
-21- 
reasonable, but wrong. In short, the instruction misstates the law and likely 
prejudiced the outcome of the trial. 
CONCLUSION 
 For the foregoing reasons, this Court should reverse and remand for a 
new trial. 
 Respectfully submitted on, November 14, 2018. 
 /s/: Brett J. DelPorto  
BRETT J. DELPORTO (6862)                   
 Counsel for Appellant 
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______________________________________________________________________________________
PRESENT
Clerk:    andrewe
Prosecutor: PALUMBO, MICHAEL D
Defendant Present
The defendant is not in custody
Defendant's Attorney(s): HANSEEN, SAMUEL J
DEFENDANT INFORMATION
Date of birth: July 7, 1957
Sheriff Office#: 396129
Audio
Tape Number:     N42   Tape Count: 9:22-9:38
CHARGES
8. FAIL TO RENDER A PROPER TAX RETURN - 3rd Degree Felony
Plea: Not Guilty  - Disposition: 08/30/2017 Guilty
10. FAIL TO RENDER A PROPER TAX RETURN - 3rd Degree Felony
Plea: Not Guilty  - Disposition: 08/30/2017 Guilty
11. TAX EVASION - 2nd Degree Felony
Plea: Not Guilty  - Disposition: 08/30/2017 Guilty
12. FAIL TO RENDER A PROPER TAX RETURN - 3rd Degree Felony
Plea: Not Guilty  - Disposition: 08/30/2017 Guilty
13. PATTERN OF UNLAW ACTIVITY - 2nd Degree Felony
Plea: Not Guilty  - Disposition: 08/30/2017 Dismissed w/ Prejudi
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The Order of the Court is stated below:
Dated: October 20, 2017 At the direction of:







Case No: 161910347 Date:    Oct 20, 2017
______________________________________________________________________________________
SENTENCE PRISON
Based on the defendant's conviction of FAIL TO RENDER A PROPER TAX RETURN a 3rd Degree 
Felony, the defendant is sentenced to an indeterminate term of not to exceed five years
in the Utah State Prison.
Based on the defendant's conviction of FAIL TO RENDER A PROPER TAX RETURN a 3rd Degree 
Felony, the defendant is sentenced to an indeterminate term of not to exceed five years
in the Utah State Prison.
Based on the defendant's conviction of TAX EVASION a 2nd Degree Felony, the defendant 
is sentenced to an indeterminate term of not less than one year nor more than fifteen 
years in the Utah State Prison.
Based on the defendant's conviction of FAIL TO RENDER A PROPER TAX RETURN a 3rd Degree 
Felony, the defendant is sentenced to an indeterminate term of not to exceed five years
in the Utah State Prison.
To the SALT LAKE County Sheriff:  The defendant is remanded to your custody for 
transportation to the Utah State Prison where the defendant will be confined.
SENTENCE PRISON CONCURRENT/CONSECUTIVE NOTE
Prison sentences to run concurrent with each other.
Restitution Amount: $23930.00 Plus Interest
End Of Order - Signature at the Top of the First Page
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CERTIFICATE OF NOTIFICATION
I certify that a copy of the attached document was sent to the following people for 
case 161910347 by the method and on the date specified.
EMAIL:  PRISON RECORDS udc-records@utah.gov
EMAIL:  ADC TRANSPORT ADC-Transportation@slco.org
10/20/2017 /s/ ANDREW ERMER
Date: ____________________ ______________________________
Deputy Court Clerk
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KeyCite Yellow Flag - Negative Treatment 
Proposed Legislation 
West’s Utah Code Annotated 
Title 76. Utah Criminal Code 
Chapter 8. Offenses Against the Administration of Government 
Part 11. Taxation 
U.C.A. 1953 § 76-8-1101
§ 76-8-1101. Criminal offenses and penalties relating to revenue and taxation--
Rulemaking authority--Statute of limitations 
Currentness
(1)(a) As provided in Section 59-1-401, criminal offenses and penalties are as 
provided in Subsections (1)(b) through (e).(b)(i) Any person who is required by 
Title 59, Revenue and Taxation, or any laws the State Tax Commission 
administers or regulates to register with or obtain a license or permit from the 
State Tax Commission, who operates without having registered or secured a 
license or permit, or who operates when the registration, license, or permit is 
expired or not current, is guilty of a class B misdemeanor. 
(ii) Notwithstanding Section 76-3-301, for purposes of Subsection (1)(b)(i),
the penalty may not: 





 (c)(i) With respect to a tax, fee, or charge as defined in Section 59-1-401, any 
person who knowingly and intentionally, and without a reasonable good faith 
basis, fails to make, render, sign, or verify any return within the time required by 
law or to supply any information within the time required by law, or who makes, 
renders, signs, or verifies any false or fraudulent return or statement, or who 
supplies any false or fraudulent information, is guilty of a third degree felony. 
  (ii) Notwithstanding Section 76-3-301, for purposes of Subsection (1)(c)(i), 
the penalty may not: 
  (A) be less than $1,000; or 
  (B) exceed $5,000. 
  (d)(i) Any person who intentionally or willfully attempts to evade or defeat 
any tax, fee, or charge as defined in Section 59-1-401 or the payment of a tax, fee, 
or charge as defined in Section 59-1-401 is, in addition to other penalties provided 
by law, guilty of a second degree felony. 
 (ii) Notwithstanding Section 76-3-301, for purposes of Subsection (1)(d)(i), 
the penalty may not: 
 (A) be less than $1,500; or 
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  (B) exceed $25,000. 
  (e)(i) A person is guilty of a second degree felony if that person commits an 
act: 
  (A) described in Subsection (1)(e)(ii) with respect to one or more of the 
following documents: 
  (I) a return; 
  (II) an affidavit; 
  (III) a claim; or 
  (IV) a document similar to Subsections (1)(e)(i)(A)(I) through (III); and 
(B) subject to Subsection (1)(e)(iii), with knowledge that the document 
described in Subsection (1)(e)(i)(A): 
  (I) is false or fraudulent as to any material matter; and 
  (II) could be used in connection with any material matter administered by 
the State Tax Commission. 
  (ii) The following acts apply to Subsection (1)(e)(i): 
 (A) preparing any portion of a document described in Subsection 
(1)(e)(i)(A); 





  (C) procuring any portion of a document described in Subsection 
(1)(e)(i)(A); 
   (D) advising in the preparation or presentation of any portion of a 
document described in Subsection (1)(e)(i)(A); 
  (E) aiding in the preparation or presentation of any portion of a 
document described in Subsection (1)(e)(i)(A); 
  (F) assisting in the preparation or presentation of any portion of a 
document described in Subsection (1)(e)(i)(A); or 
  (G) counseling in the preparation or presentation of any portion of a 
document described in Subsection (1)(e)(i)(A). 
  (iii) This Subsection (1)(e) applies: 
  (A) regardless of whether the person for which the document 
described in Subsection (1)(e)(i)(A) is prepared or presented: 
  (I) knew of the falsity of the document described in Subsection 
(1)(e)(i)(A); or 
  (II) consented to the falsity of the document described in Subsection 
(1)(e)(i)(A); and 




 (iv) Notwithstanding Section 76-3-301, for purposes of this Subsection (1)(e), 
the penalty may not: 
  (A) be less than $1,500; or 
  (B) exceed $25,000. 
 (v) In accordance with Title 63G, Chapter 3, Utah Administrative 
Rulemaking Act, the State Tax Commission may make rules prescribing the 
documents that are similar to Subsections (1)(e)(i)(A)(I) through (III). 
  (2) The statute of limitations for prosecution for a violation of this section is 
the later of six years: 
  (a) from the date the tax should have been remitted; or 
  (b) after the day on which the person commits the criminal offense. 
 Credits 
Laws 1987, c. 3, § 57; Laws 2001, c. 177, § 2, eff. July 1, 2001; Laws 2004, c. 67, § 2, 
eff. May 3, 2004; Laws 2008, c. 382, § 2183, eff. May 5, 2008; Laws 2009, c. 336, § 2, 
eff. March 25, 2009; Laws 2014, c. 52, § 2, eff. May 13, 2014. 
  
 
 
  
